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Résumé 
Cet article cherche à déterminer dans quelle mesure et 
dans quel contexte les administrateurs d’un comité 
d’audit expriment leurs préférences et leurs points de 
vue à la direction financière ainsi qu’aux auditeurs 
inernes et externes, de manière à exercer une influence 
sur la qualité des états financiers ou la robustesse du 
controle interne de l’entreprise. Ce travail se fonde sur 
une approche compréhensive avec 27 entretiens menés 
auprès de membres des comités d’audit d’entreprises 
cotées au CAC 40. Il apparaît qu’au sein d’un comité 
d’audit, deux types de collaboration sont possibles : 
une “collégialité contrainte” ou une “culture de 
collaboration” (Hargreaves, 1994). La “collégialité 
contrainte” semble être la configuration de travail 
initiale d’un comité d’audit. Elle conduit à une 
situation de défiance et ne permet pas aux 
administrateurs de s’exprimer de manière audible. Le 
président du comité d’audit joue alors un rôle majeur 
dans la transition d’une situation de “collégialité 
contrainte” à celle d’une “culture de collaboration”. Il 
provoque des réunions informelles, montre sa 
réceptivité et permet ainsi aux membres du comité 
d’audit de s’exprimer  et d’être entendus. Cette 
“culture de collaboration” implique que les 
administrateurs ont un pouvoir de suggestion, pouvoir 
efficace car ayant une influence sur “l’autrui 
généralisé” (Mead, 1934) des autres membres du 
comité. “L’autrui généralisé” agit alors comme un 
censeur. 
 
Abstract 
This article endeavours to determine in which extent 
and in which context the audit committee directors 
express their preferences and their points of view to 
the financial team members and to external and 
internal auditors, in order that they can have an 
influence on the quality of financial statements or on 
the robustness of firm’s internal control. This work 
follows a comprehensive approach from the analysis 
of 27 interviews led with some attendees of the audit 
committee meetings of CAC 40 companies (Paris 
Stock Exchange). Two types of collaboration are 
possible between the attendees: a “contrived 
collegiality” or a “culture of collaboration” 
(Hargreaves, 1994). The “contrived collegiality” 
seems to be the start situation of an audit committee 
working. This “contrived collegiality” leads to 
mistrust such as it does not allow the directors to 
express themselves in an audible manner. The audit 
committee chairman plays the major role in the 
passage from a “contrived collegiality” to a “culture 
of collaboration”. It is the chairman who creates 
informal meetings and shows his receptiveness. It 
allows the audit committee to have a possible way to 
express itself and to be heard. Nevertheless this 
“culture of collaboration” implies that the directors 
have only a power of suggesting. The suggestion can 
be effective because it has an influence on the 
“generalized other” (Mead, 1934) of others attendees. 
“The generalized other” acts as a censor. 
 
Mots clés: processus du comité d’audit, voix des 
administrateurs, collégialité contrainte, autrui 
généralisé. 
Key words: audit committee process, directors’ voice, 
contrived collegiality, generalized other. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Even if the audit committee is a corporate governance institution established in Europe 
for fifteen years, we know little about the working of these committees. We know the number 
of meetings, the charge of attendees which is communicated through the financial statements 
but no minutes are disclosed. The question about how audit committees work remains entire. 
The European Directive of 17 may 2006 on statutory audits of accounts states the topics the 
audit committees have to tackle. Nevertheless the European Directive does not explain how 
the directors do for tackling these topics. The assignments given by the European Directive to 
directors are these ones: a) monitoring the financial reporting process; b) monitoring the 
effectiveness of the company's internal control, internal audit where applicable, and risk 
management systems; c) monitoring the statutory audit of the annual and consolidated 
accounts; d) reviewing and monitoring the independence of the statutory auditor or audit firm, 
and in particular the provision of additional services to the audited entity. 
What does “monitoring” or “reviewing” mean concretely? What do exactly the 
directors? If we refer to the corporate governance codes used in France – codes which have a 
legal enforcement with the institutionalization of the “comply or explain” principle – the audit 
committee “has to assume two of the main missions of the board of directors: the management 
monitoring and the checking of the reliability and the clarity of information which will be 
given to shareholders and to financial markets” (Bouton, 2002). So the audit committee has to 
“monitor”, to “check” and to “review” the topics which concern the audit committee. The 
question about what the directors do actually to “monitor”, to “check” and to “review” 
remains entire. The external auditors have also a mission of monitoring and of reviewing. By 
the way of concluding their mission, external auditors write an audit report which expresses 
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their opinions about the quality of company’s financial statements. Such as the external 
auditor with his audit report, the audit committee chairman gives audit committee’s 
conclusions during the meetings of the board of directors. Nevertheless as regards the external 
auditor the audit report is not the only moment for expressing his opinions, he can express 
also these throughout the audit process. Indeed the audit process has been described as a 
relational process (Richard, 2006) in the course of which the auditors express their opinions to 
company’s financial team. This situation involves the existence of negotiations between 
external auditors and company’s management (Beattie and al., 2000; Beattie and al., 2001; 
Gibbins and al., 2001; Gibbins and al., 2005). Is it the same way for the audit committee 
directors? Do they express their opinions or their disagreements to the financial management 
or to the internal and external auditors? The terms “review” or “check” which are used for 
describing the audit committee missions do not allow us to suppose that the audit committee 
expresses itself. The previous research works which were interested in the understanding of 
the audit committee process (Spira, 2002; Spira, 2006; Gendron et al., 2004; Gendron and 
Bédard, 2006; Turley and Zaman, 2007) had not really asked the issue of the expression of the 
audit committee directors. Even if these research works show an expression of the audit 
committee directors, they only show that the audit committee directors ask some questions to 
the management. This issue is central since it is a matter of determining if the audit committee 
is a passive corporate governance institution which is satisfied with perusing issues and with 
informing the board of directors about these issues (it “checks” and it “reviews”) or if the 
audit committee is a corporate governance institution which could disagree, ask some changes 
and give some orientations to the management about the issues it is aware (it “monitors”). In 
order to determine in which extent the directors express themselves and to understand the way 
they use to do that, we conducted 27 interviews with audit committee directors, CFOs and 
external and internal auditors of French companies listed on the CAC 40 index of the Paris 
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Stock Exchange. We find the directors express themselves beyond asking questions even if 
the context of expression is not favourable for them. Nevertheless this expression appears 
only in the course of a conversation. Because directors’ opinion is not expected by the 
management or by the auditors, the directors cannot express their opinions in a strong manner. 
They rather suggest, they rather get over some messages they consider as important in the 
course of conversations. These conversations do not necessarily take place during the formal 
audit committee meetings. Informal meetings occur, between the audit committee chairman 
and the management team or the auditors. 
The next parts are devoted to a literature review on the audit committee process (1), 
then to a description of our interviews-based method (2) and finally to the presentation of our 
results on the way to express yourself when you are a director in an audit committee (3). 
 
1. THE AUDIT COMMITTEE PROCESS 
This research work will be situated inside the audit committee research area and a 
particular attention will be given to the definition of our research subject: the audit committee 
process (1.1). Finally the studies able to help us to give some start responses to our research 
question will be presented and discussed (1.2). 
1.1. The audit committee: formal and informal processes 
Two literature reviews are mainly quoted by researchers: the one of DeZoort and al. 
(2002) and the one of Turley and Zaman (2004). Turley and Zaman (2004) suggest to classify 
different research on audit committees according to the nature of identified effects audit 
committees could have: effects on agency costs, effects on auditing, effects on financial 
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statements quality, and effects on corporate governance quality. As DeZoort and al. (2002), 
they suggest to classifying works on audit committees’ effectiveness according to audit 
committees characteristics that explain this effectiveness: composition, resources, authority 
and process.  
In this framework, Gendron and Bédard (2008) suggest a synthesis of these two 
classifications: they consider the three characteristics of audit committees described by 
DeZoort and al. (composition, resources and authority) as they express themselves during the 
audit committee process. The presence of the audit committee could have several effects that 
Gendron and Bédard have identified. 
[Insert Graph 1 Here] 
Our research paper mainly tries to understand the audit committees’ process, that is to 
say the way they are working. We are keeping in mind this process has consequences on 
auditing, on financial statements. We are also keeping in mind that this process is dependent 
of audit committee’s composition, resources and authority. Nevertheless these specified 
characteristics do not constitute our main research object. 
Few works define really the audit committee process. DeZoort and al. (2002) consider 
the audit committee process as a whole of procedures directors implement. Turley and Zaman 
(2007) differentiate the formal process, which corresponds to the audit committee meetings, 
to the informal process, which corresponds to the whole of contacts between the directors and 
the other attendees outside formal meetings. As Spira (2002) highlights, some documents are 
prepared before the formal audit committee meetings. As these documents have the only goal 
to be presented to the directors, their preparation is considered as a stage in itself of the audit 
committee process. This preparatory stage, which takes place before the formal meetings, is 
the time of the construction of documents and presentations that will be done during the audit 
committee meetings. It includes also the informal meetings that occur between the audit 
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committee directors (represented by its chairman the most of the time) and the other 
attendees. These informal meetings constitute what Turley and Zaman (2007) call the 
informal process, that is to say conversations in the course of which the directors could be led 
to give their points of view about various topics. Some of them could be held without the 
presence of any directors, as Gendron and Bédard (2008) describe. After this preparatory 
stage, a formal meetings stage comes, what Turley and Zaman (2007) call the formal process. 
During this formal meetings stage, some presentations are given to the directors. These last 
ones try to form their own opinion both about the presentations that are proposed and the 
people who make these presentations. Some questions can be asked and give rise to answers. 
A discussion, sometimes an argument, then starts and the directors can be led to express their 
points of view. Finally a conclusion stage follows the formal meetings stage. During this 
conclusion stage the audit committee chairman gives a report about the audit committee 
meetings to the board of directors, the minutes are distributed. 
As the audit committee process is defined and the process stages in the course of 
which the directors express themselves are identified, it is time to take an interest in the 
previous research works which can bring a light to our research question: the issue of an 
opinion expression by the directors to others audit committee meetings attendees. 
1.2. The questions and answers game 
Through the descriptions about the audit committee working, a way of expressing used 
by directors is especially highlighted: asking questions. During the audit committee meetings 
and during informal meetings between the audit committee chairman and some of others 
formal meetings attendees too, a “questions and answers game”, as Spira (2002) calls, 
appears. This questions and answers game lasts as long as an answer seems satisfying the 
director in his opinion. The directors begin the game and decide when they want the game 
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stops. Spira (2003) distinguishes three levels of questions. The first level corresponds to 
foreseen questions for which written answers have been prepared. The second level 
corresponds to foreseen questions for which no answers have been prepared. And the third 
level corresponds to not foreseen questions. Acting and answering favourably to a third level 
question make feeling more comfortable the participants to the “questions / answers game”. 
The good answer constitutes a proof of the audit committee effectiveness, more precisely of 
the ceremonial effectiveness. As Gendron and Bédard (2006) underline it, the existence of 
questions asked by the audit committee members and the recognition of the abilities of the 
directors to ask the good questions – that is to say the questions which hurt – constitute a 
shared sign about the well-working of the audit committee. So it seems that all questions have 
not the only purpose to be informed. These questions aim some tacit messages on audit 
committee effectiveness too. 
Nevertheless Spira (2006) underlines that one of the important rules for the audit 
committee working is to operate in a consensual manner. In order a board of directors or an 
audit committee works well, a consensus does necessarily exist. Indeed the tension which 
could exist between attendees could harm the good working, the good processing of the audit 
committee. This need to keep a consensus is clearly in competition with the need to ask 
questions. 
These research studies seem to show that the directors express themselves in a certain 
extent, but only in a certain extent. It remains to explore the specific context of the audit 
committee as the space of directors’ expression and to determine in which extent the directors 
express themselves beyond asking questions. The next part will be devoted to the description 
of the qualitative method we have used. 
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2. METHODOLOGY 
After having discussed the French case (2.1), we present the qualitative method used 
for the data collection and give the way we analyse the speeches (2.2). 
2.1. Audit committees in France 
According to the UK Cadbury Code (1992), French people have a corporate 
governance code: the Viénot report (1995). This report led to the emergence of the audit 
committees in France (Piot, 2004), since it recommends its establishment. The “concept” of 
audit committee from this Viénot report (1995) is directly imported from the Anglo-Saxon 
reflections. The codes of good governance that followed (Viénot 2, 1999; Bouton, 2002; 
Combined Code, 2003) have reinforced the Anglo-Saxon filiation. However, until the 
transposition of the 8th directive, in December 2008, which legalizes the existence of audit 
committees, the establishment of an audit committee wasn’t mandatory. More, it came into 
conflict with the Article 230 of the Companies act1. The establishment of an Audit Committee 
was simply recommended by the codes of good governance from professional organizations 
and AMF. In practice, almost all of the listed companies had already established such an audit 
committee at the end of 2008 (AMF, 2008). The decree of the 8th December 2008, under the 
DDAC law (2008) mandating the establishment of the audit committees for the listed 
companies, has only endorsed an already strong practice. 
The essence of Anglo-Saxon requirements for audit committees is unquestionable: the 
emphasis is on the structure (composition: independence and financial expertise, etc.) rather 
than the process, few pieces of information are given on the content of mission assigned to the 
                                                 
1 This section prohibits the communication between external auditors and a small group of administrators for 
ethical reasons. The auditors could not speak before the Board as a whole. Professional secrecy of the external 
auditors was not raised in respect of the Audit Committee. In practice, boards of directors, however, have lifted 
the obligation of external auditors. 
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audit committee. Few divergences exist, for example concerning the sustainability of the audit 
committee. It has to be composed in 2/3 of independent directors. The independence is 
defined similarly to the Anglo-Saxon world apart for the fact that the quality of independence 
is lost after twelve years and not after ten as it is recommended by the Higgs report (2003). In 
parallel, by the application of the LSF (2003), the rotation of audit partners is every six years, 
that is the statutory audit mandate. However, the rotation rule is not uniformly respected, 
including the CAC 40 companies. 
2.2. The data collection 
The study aims to analyze the expression of an opinion from the directors to the other 
participants of the audit committee process. So such a study has the ambition to contribute to 
open the audit committee « black box ». The best way to access to this reality is the direct 
observation. Though this “black box” remains also strongly impenetrable for the researchers. 
Indeed the access to the audit committee meetings did turned out impossible because of some 
confidentiality reasons. As for the access to the informal meetings, it is impossible to observe 
these meetings because they are confidential by nature, the interest of these meetings lying in 
the fact that they take place without the presence of an external glance, even researcher’s 
glance. So as the audit committee working remains unobservable for the researcher, this 
research work relies on the speeches of attendees who are: the audit committee directors, the 
external auditors, the internal auditors and the CFOs. The speeches collection has been done 
through interviews with attendees of the audit committee meetings of CAC 40 companies 
(CAC 40 is the Paris Stock Exchange). The interview partly can catch the lived facts and 
collect a first interpretation of the actors who live the audit committee experience as Blanchet 
and Gotman (1992) underline it: « The survey by interviews is the preferential tool of 
exploring the facts of which the speech is the principal vector. These facts concern 
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representation systems (constructed thinking) and the social practices (experienced facts) ». 
So the research approach used here is interpretative and comprehensive in the sense of Weber 
(1965). The CAC 40 companies are the first ones in France which have created an audit 
committee, following the recommendations of the Viénot report in 1995 (Piot, 2004) because 
of their greater exposure. These companies have a relatively old practice about the audit 
committee. So we can assume that they will have richer practices. 
Twenty-seven semi-directive interviews have been led with eight external auditors, 
with eight audit committee directors who have an independent status and whose four are the 
audit committee chairman, with four CFOs and finally with seven people in charge of the 
internal audit function (summary table of interviews is available in appendix 1). On these 
twenty-seven interviews we have the permission to register twenty-two. These twenty-two 
interviews are also transcribed in entire and sent to interviewees in order that they control the 
contents. As regards the fifth interviews that cannot have been registered and transcribed, 
some notes have been made during the interview. Because of the absence of transcription, 
these interviews cannot have been the object of a meticulous content analysis but they have 
contributed to feed our reflexion. 
The analysis approach has been in several stages. First the interviews have been 
analyzed individually in order to identify the main themes and especially the themes that are 
common to the different interviews. Then a transversal and thematic analysis has been led 
with a manual encoding. The chosen unit for the encoding has been the paragraph of sense. 
This process, as Miles and Huberman (1994) underline, has allowed to produce a used volume 
of data in excluding the paragraphs that did not concern the research question. Finally a 
second analysis, interview by interview, has been made to comprehend the construction of 
interviewees’ speeches and to bring to light the contradictions that can exist during the speech 
(Bardin, 1993). 
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The interpretation of the speeches is based on the works of two different researchers: 
Hargreaves (1994) who is an education sociologist and Mead (1934) who is the founder of the 
social psychology. Their respective works allow us to interpret the audit committee process as 
a “contrived collegiality” (Hargreaves, 1994) and to understand the directors have to be able 
to internalize the “ generalized other”, i.e. conventions and expectations emanating from 
participants with whom they interact (Mead, 1934). 
 
3. HOW TO MAKE ITS VOICE HEARD: THE ROLE OF THE DIRECTORS IN 
AN AUDIT COMMITTEE 
The audit committee does not constitute an easy place for the directors to express 
themselves because the audit committees can work as a “contrived collegiality” (3.1). So the 
directors have to create relationships favourable to the development of a “culture of 
collaboration” which favours directors’ possibilities of expressing themselves (3.2). In this 
space for expression, directors contribute to construct the “generalized other” (Mead, 1934) 
and, on this basis, suggest rather than impose (3.3). 
3.1. A contrived collegiality 
The internal and external auditors and the financial team members meet a lot 
throughout the year. They have a close relationship as between peers, a relationship based on 
confidence (Richard, 2006). So these people do not wait the audit committee meetings to 
collaborate or to exchange their points of view. They do that when the issues arise throughout 
the year. On the contrary the contact with the directors is not continuous. The audit committee 
meetings constitute the reserved place for exchanging the points of view between the auditors 
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and the financial management on the one hand and the directors on the other hand. 
Nevertheless exchanges of opinion are not automatic; it depends on attendees’ wishes. Indeed 
the external auditors are not in a situation such as they are accountable to the audit committee 
directors. They do not lead their missions in aid of the directors but in aid of the public 
interest. So they have not to consider directors’ opinions as relevant to their missions. As 
regards relationships between the financial management and the directors, it exists a clear 
demarcation between management’s mission that is managing and directors’ one that is 
monitoring. The management team could see a too strong expression from the directors about 
certain issues as interference in its own mission: managing. Consequently directors’ 
expression and the acceptance of this expression are possible only if a sharing and 
collaboration atmosphere exists; everybody must be aware to hear the others. The question 
about the collaboration and the understanding is also stresses: Are the directors and the other 
attendees able to speak and to hear themselves about the subjects that an audit committee has 
to monitor? The analysis of interviewees’ speeches let to think that an important risk for the 
audit committee is that it works as a “contrived collegiality” in the sense of Hargreaves 
(1994). 
Hargreaves (1994) describes the “contrived collegiality” with several characteristics: it 
is an imposed collegiality, not voluntary, sometimes compulsory; it has a specific aim which 
is known in advance and the tackled subjects are determined outside, not by the participants; 
the collegiality is limited in the time and in the space; finally, the result of this collegiality is 
also known in advance. Hargreaves shows that this contrived collegiality is indeed a travesty 
of collegiality. The participants do not really participate; they reject it.  
Hargreaves’ work constitutes a good analysis model of the audit committee working as 
a context for the directors’ expression. It seems that the audit committee starts to work as a 
“contrived collegiality” and this contrived collegiality let few place for directors to express 
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themselves. Indeed certain contrived collegiality characteristics are met during the formal 
audit committee meetings. The first of these characteristics is that the meetings are limited in 
time and in space. They have a planed duration that has to be respected. The meeting begins at 
an exactly time and finishes at an exactly time too, only letting a short meeting duration – 
most of time two or three hours – as an external says us: 
« It begins at 1: 30 pm, and it finishes at 3: 30 pm, not 29, not 31. » (A3 – F4) 
The fact that these meetings spend a short time constitutes in attendees’ eyes a 
constraint for the good discussion working by limiting the discussion depth. This lack of 
meeting time flexibility avoids the sharing of points of view between the directors and the 
other attendees and avoids a real collaboration as the same external auditor underlines: 
« Finally, people meet two hours, so, two hours from time to time, well. If we want to 
have a technical discussion, it won’t be two hours, so... We will take a day or an 
afternoon. » (A3 – F4) 
A second of contrived collegiality’s characteristics is met in the audit committee 
working. It is the fact that the topics which are the object of discussion are not determined in 
function of attendees’ need. There are not the attendees who determine the discussed issues in 
order to obtain directors’ point of view for example. The discussed issues are more 
determined in an institutional manner. Especially the accounts constitute the main 
conversation object for the audit committees. And so the accounts take a significant time of 
these meetings. It cannot really let time for others subjects which can be chosen by meetings 
attendees. It is this idea that we find in the speech of a chief of internal audit: 
« But inside, it is necessary to be realistic… I would say that two thirds of subjects are 
almost dictated by reglementary duties: the cut off options we would want to do before 
the end of year, the annual statements, the biannual statements… […] So, it is… we 
have a lot of duties which are dictated. » (F8) 
These few elements added to the fact that quoted companies have the legal or 
institutional obligation (because of the good corporate governance criteria asked by financial 
markets) to settle an audit committee explain the fact that these audit committees work as a 
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contrived collegiality. The audit committees also work as a travesty of collegiality, as a 
ceremony in the sense of Spira (2002). It involves that the audit committees are playacting 
where only a few place exist for the sharing and so for the expression of the audit committee 
directors about their preferences and their expectations. The fact that the audit committees 
work as a contrived collegiality involves the negative effects highlighted by Hargreaves 
(1994), that is to say the appearance of a mistrust between the directors and the other audit 
committee meetings attendees, even the appearance of a rejection of directors’ points of view 
by the other attendees. Indeed company management members cannot trust directors who 
finally meddle in the company’s management. A fear to lose the control on their missions for 
the benefit of the directors can appear in management’s mind as a chief of internal audit 
underlines: 
« The audit committee, it is credible when it plays its audit committee role, not when it 
takes itself for the management. » (F8) 
This same fear exists for the external auditor. The external auditors role is to challenge 
the financial management when it takes some doubtful accounting choices. This role is not 
directors’ one. So we find this fear to lose the control on their missions and so on their status 
in this external auditor’s sentiments: 
« For example, we have a little debate with F4, about technical, complicated subjects, 
we have to discuss. They don’t like we speak about that in front of the audit committee 
because they are always afraid that people, badly informed, begin to contradict some 
decisions, some issues about which, nevertheless, we, auditors and company, we 
agreed. Because they don’t understand well, because, I don’t know, because they find 
that it isn’t the proper way. That, that is a little bit boring because… It seems to me that 
we have to feel, both sides, company and auditors, if at some point we handled a 
complicated issue and we found a satisfactory technical solution, we have to fell 
sufficiently strong... We could have this paradox. The audit committee gives itself some 
rights superior to auditor’s ones in a sense since it supervises, oversees our activity. 
And as a result, they say to us « I don’t understand why you said yes to the company ». 
And so there, so there, we would be in a little complicated situation. » (A3 – F4) 
That lets to think that the formal audit committee meetings constitute a difficult 
context for directors to express themselves. As this last interview extract lets to think, the 
audit committee meetings attendees other than the directors could be in a position as they 
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reject the possible collegiality or collaboration. It involves that the expression of points of 
view by the directors can be lived as an intrusion in their personal territories. If this intrusion 
is really felt, as it seems the case in the company F4 which is the subject of the interview 
extract above, the company management as the auditors would try to forget to disclose some 
subjects during audit committee meetings, avoiding that the directors give their points of view 
or their preferences or the directors ask questions. 
So this contrived collegiality situation can has as consequence to withdraw all the 
matters which could be objects for the collaboration. The directors can be in a situation such 
as they are not conscious of the main company issues, issues about which they would want to 
express themselves if they knew. Directors’ voice cannot be heard, because they do not know 
the issues. As Turley and Zaman (2007) underline, the audit committee directors depend of 
the information the other attendees want to show him in a certain extent. 
Nevertheless this situation has limits as regards the internal auditors. Indeed the 
internal auditors can be hierarchically accountable to the directors on the contrary to the 
financial management members and the external auditors. So giving an account and giving 
informations they have is a part of their missions as an audit committee chairman says: 
« And so, I think that the person in charge of internal audit has a double responsibility. 
He is accountable, of course, to the management, to report to the management the 
whole of his recording. But he is accountable to the audit committee in the same way. » 
(F3) 
The fact that internal auditors are accountable to the audit committee directors let 
these last ones express their opinion about the presented issues in a more favourable context. 
Then they have a greater freedom of tone – a freedom to make biting remarks – comparing 
with the financial management members or with the external auditors. It is what an external 
auditor says: 
« If it is about the audit, it [the audit committee] goes rather far. I want to say that… the 
internal audit, in the sense that it isn’t rare that they say « On such point, your way of 
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seeing things seems to me insufficient. Our experience, etc. It is necessary to see that 
again. » » (F10) 
As regards the financial management or the external auditors, the directors cannot 
express themselves without the existence of attendees’ will to collaborate, since the directors 
depend on others to obtain relevant information (Turley and Zaman, 2007). As such, they 
cannot allow themselves to bully the external auditors or the financial management members. 
It is what says an external auditor in a prudent manner:  
« So, it is the question of, the audit committee intervention is enough, enough complex 
because that is, that is a question of proportions between..., to where to go too far and, 
to where to go not enough far. That's right it is rather difficult for audit committees. » 
(A3-1) 
As the audit committee meetings have tendency to work as a contrived collegiality, the 
possibilities of the audit committee directors to express themselves in an audible manner are 
small. So in order to give a real role to the audit committee and to have a real possibility of 
expressing themselves, the directors have to create an atmosphere and a collaboration such as 
they have relevant information on the one hand and they have a possibility of expressing 
themselves in the other hand. 
3.2. A culture of collaboration 
In order to have more possibilities to express themselves the directors, have to make 
the audit committee evolves to a “culture of collaboration” (Hargreaves, 1994).  
In opposition to the contrived collegiality, Hargreaves (1994) describes another type of 
collegiality or collaboration: the “culture of collaboration”. He defines this “culture of 
collaboration” with several characteristics which are opposed to the “contrived collegiality” 
ones: this collaboration is spontaneous and voluntary because the participants recognize an 
interest in that; it is more informal, not fixed in the time and the space, according to the 
participants’ needs; people choose themselves the subjects of this collaboration; finally, the 
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results of this collaboration are not known in advance. In a context of “culture collaboration” 
all attendees are free and equal, that is to mean that the directors have not a particular place 
which can give to their voice an influence with regards the others attendees. For creating this 
particular context, the directors have to act with tact. They are not in a situation such as they 
can demand. They have to take some sufficient precautions in speaking in order that the 
financial team members or the external auditors do not lose their face, in the sense given by 
Goffman (1963). They have to be cautious during the public interactions in order not to 
offend anyone, in order that attendees’ status remains intact. It is what an audit committee 
chairman implies in these words: 
« About the accounts, I would say that in a general manner, it is enough rare the audit 
committee finds something unsatisfactory in the accounts. On the other hand, when it 
finds something, it isn’t done like that. If you want, as a rule… an audit committee has a 
dialogue with the CFO and sees the issues which are, about which an hesitation can 
exist. » (F10) 
The directors are totally conscious of this situation. They are aware a good working of 
an audit committee rests on the existence of good relationships between the directors and the 
other attendees. These good relationships allow the directors to obtain relevant information 
and to create the opportunity to express themselves. These good relationships only can exist in 
a relaxed atmosphere. For having this atmosphere, it is necessary to create it. An audit 
committee chairman explains: 
« That should not be a court, if we want that oysters close … So, I think it’s necessary to 
have, in the same time... I want to say... a minimum of respect and the feeling of 
obligations to be receptive. » (F3) 
Also this mutual respect atmosphere (even an mutual equality atmosphere), allowing the face 
maintenance of all attendees, is recognized as an important component of the effectiveness of 
an audit committee. As an external auditor underlines, he considers the audit committee 
meetings as an exchange time, as a dialogue when the collaboration becomes possible. It is 
necessary that a feeling of equality does exist between the attendees:  
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« Now, I don’t feel I’m on the gril, if you want. It isn’t a questioning. It is really.., for 
me, it is an exchange. […] There are the financial management, we, the committee 
members. So, everybody speaks alternately. There is, on certain points… yes, there are 
exchanges of sight about some subjects. I prefer the term exchange than examination. » 
(A1-1) 
Thus it is important that the directors and the other audit committee attendees feel 
equal in order that the dialogue is considered as possible. That is the first necessary condition 
in order that a collaboration could exist. The construction of this feeling about the status 
equality is the product of interactions during which the directors play an active role. It is what 
an internal auditor chief underlines in the following interview extract: 
« When I took up my post, a little apprehension because, we don’t know together [him 
and the the audit committee]. Still, I don’t know the audit committee members. All the 
other attendees, even the external auditors, we know them. We don’t know how it goes, 
we don’t know which questions are asked. At once, they put you comfortable. » (F9) 
Establishing the dialogue is the first element that the audit committee directors 
introduce in order to establish the collaboration. A second element which is tried to be created 
by the directors is a confidence relationship with the other attendees. Trust is a complex 
feeling. The directors cannot impose to other attendees to trust them. They only can create a 
climate which is favourable for the appearance of this confidence. The discussion tone during 
the meetings is also an important element for establishing a confidence climate. Another 
possibility to create this confidence is to organize others meetings than the formal ones. These 
meetings in other place and in other time can be more favourable for the establishment of a 
close relationship. These meetings outside the formal audit committee meetings and outside 
the company seem rather being meetings during which only the audit committee chairman is 
present with one or two other people – auditors or financial team members. These meetings 
aim to assemble few people in order to establish a more particular relationship which can 
becomes more private. An audit committee chairman explains us that regularly he takes lunch 
or dinner with company’s external auditors in one hand: 
« Personally as the audit committee chairman I had got used to meeting for the lunch, 
personally, the external auditor, alone together, to discuss about all issues. […] For 
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these lunches, I lunched or they came to see me at home, so that there is a real 
conversation, on the one hand an extremely free conversation, and on the other hand, if 
you want, a little less professional contact with the external auditors than, within the 
audit committee. » (F12) 
He tells also his meetings with the chief of internal audit: 
« The chief of internal audit had got used to coming to see me at home, personally and 
alone together, two or three times per year. So, before the meetings, he came to say it to 
me… It was very free! […] We spoke two hours, two hours and half. » (F12) 
Diverse elements can be highlighted in these interview extracts. It is indeed at the audit 
committee chairman initiative that these private meetings take place. He expressly expresses 
the fact that these meetings aim to create a little less professional relationships, that is to say a 
a little bit closer in order to allow the appearance of trust. These meetings rest on the dialogue 
and on the discussion. Finally the audit committee chairman has the external and internal 
auditors for lunch, at home, that seems to us a very big mark of consideration from the audit 
committee chairman to the auditors, who can feel most obliged to the same consideration 
about him in return. In the case of the meetings with the external auditors, the meeting takes 
place during the lunch, what gives a little different tone to the meeting. Even if the main aim 
is for the audit committee chairman to obtain relevant information and to have the possibility 
to express himself, this purpose is partially diverted by the lunch activity which is more 
favourable of the exchanges. These more informal meetings are a means for the audit 
committee chairman to show his great receptiveness to his guests. This message from the 
audit committee chairman, that is to say “I am available to discuss with you when you need” 
is well understood. The financial management and the internal auditors ask for having 
meetings in order to discuss and obtain audit committee chairman’s point of view. Indeed the 
chairman seems to be the directors with who they discuss the more. It is what a CFO says to 
us: 
« Myself, from time to time, I can visit the audit committee chairman, to have a totally 
independent sight, take a coffee with him to talk about this and that. » (F6) 
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The audit committee chairman, and the other directors in a less extent, try to establish 
an atmosphere of respect and equality by being constructive and respectful as regards other 
attendees’ status. They try to create a dialogue during the formal meetings and outside the 
formal meetings especially with the audit committee chairman. Finally this last one tries to 
show a very great receptiveness of listening and advising for the auditors and for the financial 
management. In doing that the audit committee achieves to create moments when it can 
express itself and be heard, especially through the audit committee chairman voice. 
Sometimes the CFO or the internal auditor asks for a meeting in the only purpose to collect 
his point of view. The relationships establishing between the audit committee chairman on the 
one hand and the financial management or internal auditors in the other hand get closer to a 
« culture of collaboration » (Hargreaves, 1994). Indeed the collaboration becomes 
spontaneous, voluntary, appears on the initiative of the auditors or of the financial 
management members. It is not planed and takes place rather in informal surroundings 
manner: during a lunch or around a coffee. Finally the discussion subjects, that is to say the 
collaboration subjects, are not determined by an external agenda. They correspond to the 
actual concerns. This description resumes all the characteristics of the « culture of 
collaboration » as Hargreaves (1994) defines it. 
Nevertheless this culture of collaboration rests a lot on trust. But trust can only appear 
through time. It seems evident that it is the repetition of meetings – firstly aroused by the 
audit committee chairman who wants to show his great receptiveness – which can create some 
confidence relationships. Then the auditors or the financial management members ask, 
themselves, to have these meetings in order to obtain audit committee chairman’s point of 
view. The possibility for the audit committee to express itself can be analysed only in a 
dynamic way, by keeping in mind that it is this culture of collaboration which can allow the 
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audit committee to work beyond an contrived collegiality. These audit committee chairman’s 
words underline the importance of time in the construction of confidence relationships: 
« They [relationships between the directors and the other attendees] progress. When a 
trust relationship builds between the management, the external auditors, the audit 
committee… It is more effective for company’s good that trust relationships exist rather 
than the relationship simply remains on a formal level, for the reasons I just said 
before. But this trust relationship, it depends on people, it can build or not. And when it 
builds, it always takes time. There has to have a certain perpetuity in the audit 
committee composition, in the audit committee chair to build this mutual knowledge and 
this trust. And that isn’t always done in a good way and isn’t always done fastly. But I 
think that’s important. » (F5) 
As this audit committee chairman underlines, trust relationships so as the culture of 
collaboration can be reached or not. Even if the audit committee chairman has an active 
approach to create trust relationships, that is to say relationships which will allow him to 
express himself through the dialogue, the creation of these relationships depends on financial 
team members and auditors’ will too. They can accept these relationships or not. But since 
trust and so culture of collaboration have been built and exist, they exist as well during the 
private meetings as during the formal meetings. The culture of collaboration constructed 
during the private meetings continues to exist during the formal audit committee meetings as 
a CFO underlines: 
« Even if the presentation in itself is formal, there are documents, the external auditors 
express themselves in an argued way, the discussion in itself is a discussion between 
people knowing well in the course of years and expressing themselves in a very free and 
informal way. » (F7) 
Because the directors are not able to express themselves in contrived collegiality 
surroundings, the directors try to create favourable moments for the collaboration. A culture 
of collaboration can appears especially in the initiative of the audit committee chairman. This 
culture of collaboration allows the directors, especially the chairman, to express themselves. 
The attendees of the audit committee meetings can ask also to meet the audit committee 
chairman in order to collect his point of view about the issues they have chosen. Nevertheless 
the expression of these points of view only take place during conversations between equal 
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people, what can have certain consequences about the receiving of the message by the other 
attendees. 
3.3. The generalized other 
In order to maintain this culture of collaboration, the directors always have to be 
cautious about the manner they express themselves and about the tone they use. As this 
external auditor let us understand in this interview extract, the directors never express a too 
strong opposition. That could damage the dialogue continuity: 
« But, I say, in a general manner, it’s always constructive. It never has a real 
opposition. Possibly it can have intent advices about some recommendations but no 
opposition in itself, and, I say, no assessments… a little bite negative in these 
meetings. » (A3-2) 
The directors also express themselves without having to spell things out. They express 
themselves with messages which are not completely explicit but sufficiently understandable. 
These messages are passed through the questions they ask, questions which are full of 
allusions. The themes tackled during the meetings constitute indications about the subjects 
considered as important by the directors. They can modulate the depth of questions, stress 
more or less on certain issues. They also make some remarks, some suggestions. Most of the 
time the remarks are expressed by the audit committee chairman during private meetings not 
really during formal meetings where only questions are asked. Thus the directors express 
themselves by suggesting. Suggesting is their main way for expressing themselves. Moreover, 
remarks’ recipients feel the expression of directors’ points of view as suggestions, as a CFO 
says: 
« The audit committee can be led to give suggestions, advices, which we, normally, take 
into account, and which are then integrated in the presentation sent to the members of 
the board of directors. » (F7) 
A consequence of the fact that the directors express themselves by suggesting is that 
the financial management such as the external auditors feel free to take into consideration or 
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not these remarks or suggestions or advices. They have a freedom feeling which is 
intrinsically linked to the fact that the interactions take place in a culture of collaboration. 
Without this culture of collaboration, the directors could not express themselves. But the 
existence of this culture of collaboration involves that the directors are in position such as 
they are only advisers who make suggestions. This freedom feeling seems to be stronger for 
the external auditors than for the audit management members. Indeed the CFO whose 
comments are reported just above underlines that taking into consideration directors’ remarks 
is a normal situation with his words. In the extract of an interview with an external auditor 
just below, the auditor says he considers taking into consideration directors’ suggestions as a 
possibility: 
« So, conversely, from the conclusions or the remarks made by the audit committee, we 
effectively can always deduct that, there are certain issues which interest them a little 
bit. And responsibility to us, eventually, to adjust a little bit more your external audit 
process to these fields. » (A3-2) 
Nevertheless even if the directors have only a power of suggesting, their suggestions 
can be fruitful. For beginning the financial management and the auditors take into 
consideration what the directors want to say, they attach interest to it. That is to mean that 
they accept, during a moment, to follow what are expressed or suggested by a director – most 
of the time he is the audit committee chairman. It is connected to the fact that the directors are 
responsible for the quality of financial statements too. But even if the financial management 
or the auditors listen directors’ messages or suggestions they stress that they remains the only 
responsible for their choices or their opinions. That is what an external auditor says: 
« The great difficulty about our jobs, it’s cause there are technical components – That, 
it is simple – and some assessment components. We besides have to say on which 
foundations we have taken assessments. By definition, the assessments, it becomes less 
easy, less direct. So, people can estimate in a different way. After, the whole, it is to 
move the points of view closer together and to well understand why, why each has his 
position. Then at some point we take back our role and each his responsabilities. » (A1-
3) 
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By reasoning as the directors do, the external auditors as the other attendees 
internalized audit committee directors’ expectations. These expectations, which are suggested, 
are internalized through what Mead calls “the generalized other”. Mead (1934) considers 
every individual possesses the ability of reflexivity: he is able to understand the mind of 
people with whom he interacts. He will be able to analyze his own behaviour as if it is about 
the behaviour of another person. This detachment allows the individual to internalize certain 
conventions and expectations emanating from people with whom he interacts. These 
internalized conventions and expectations constitute “the generalized other”, which 
constitutes a censor for the individual. However “the generalized other” does not dictate 
individual’s behaviours. The individual remains free to adopt a behaviour different than the 
one waited by people with whom he interacts. The construction of this “generalized other” is 
made through the language, gestures or attitudes that are interpreted during the interactions 
between individuals. 
The generalized other constitutes some keys for analyzing own behaviours, keys that 
every people have. These keys help people to analyze the choices they have to make. Then the 
financial team members, the internal and external auditors possess these keys of analyzing. 
Some new keys are added with their interactions with the directors. It allows them to analyze 
their own behaviours towards the social role they have to play. Simple suggestions that are 
repeated can have effects on people. A form of social control is exerted. That is the purpose 
that the directors want to reach, as an audit committee chairman explains: 
« Indirectly, certainly, in the extent that the works and the debates of the committee, I 
say, as they are registered by our interlocutors of the financial management, end up 
having an echo, in the way they, in the way they present financial information. Because, 
they have registered that such or such aspects are considered as important. So, they see 
to it that the information doesn’t get lost, or is drawn in one way or another. […] It is 
for the impregnation. » (F3) 
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Directors’ suggestions, even when they are implied, then have effects that are perceived by 
the directors. These suggestions are internalized in financial team members’ mind or auditors’ 
mind through their generalized other. This generalized other acts as a censor. 
Better will be the culture of collaboration, faster will be internalized directors’ wishes 
and the less these ones will need to express themselves. So, it is absolutely possible that the 
directors who do not express themselves during the audit committee meetings do not that 
either because they do that outside the formal meetings or because their wishes and 
expectations are internalized yet. It is what an audit committee explains when he says us why 
the audit committee never asks to change the internal audit plan: 
« But, we never had really, it seems to me, asked to add something to what is proposed 
to us. We have our agreement… And they knew that on certain points, we were more 
demanding. So almost without needing to ask they put it in their audit programme. […] 
They saw well what the audit committee waited. » (F12) 
The financial management members as the internal and external auditors admit a value 
of directors’ points of view since they internalized them, and they sometimes take for their 
own account. The authority of the audit committee that comes from the authority of the board 
of directors is not the only reason why a value is admitted to directors’ suggestions. It comes 
from the fact that the quality of these suggestions is admitted. The first quality of directors’ 
points of view that is recognized is the externality of these points of view. The directors are 
not accountants; they have more non-specialized profiles. Then, they can have a point of view 
a little bit different than other attendees’ ones because they have another angle of sight which 
can be perceived as interesting by the financial management or by the external and internal 
auditors. The audit committee directors then allow internal auditors, external auditors and the 
financial management members to test or to challenge their own opinions. The audit 
committee can become a sounding board because the directors are able to bring a fresh sight 
of the issue due to their job and their experience. It is what a CFO expresses with these terms: 
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« And the comments we can make… Sometimes, he [the audit committee chairman] 
makes comments, we say ourselves… I don’t see the issue. And after a moment, you 
notice that it is effectively an issue which has... Because he has, a vision, a prism 
different of your which is totally financial. Him, he has a prism which is much wider. 
And as a result, he is going to ask you some questions about things, which he eventually 
doesn’t understand or… you go to notice that he has a very interesting angle of sight 
and it allows you to complete your point of view, to solidify it. » (F1) 
Even if directors’ expression is given only onto the tone of the suggestion, it has an 
impact. The audit committee directors have a voice that is heard. These suggestions are the 
object of attention by the financial team members and by the external and internal auditors 
because they consider that the audit committee directors potentially can have quality opinions. 
Then, the financial team members, the external and internal auditors listen these remarks, they 
perceived the messages because they are aware. They interiorize directors’ expectations and 
sometimes can answer to these expectations. Nevertheless in order that the audit committee 
can have this voice and this power of suggesting, a culture of collaboration has to develop 
within the audit committee, not a culture of mistrust as the contrived collegiality. 
 
CONCLUSION 
Expressing themselves is not an easy thing to do for the directors. The audit committee 
institution organized around formal meetings does not give favourable surroundings for the 
expression on the one hand and for the listening of this expression on the other hand. Indeed, 
expressing one’s self only in order to express one’s self without being heard has a limited 
interest. Directors’ expression only has an interest if it is heard, in order that this expression 
contribute to improve company’s management and contribute to the quality of the financial 
statements. The only formal audit committee meetings do not constitute a favourable moment 
for the expression because they work as a contrived collegiality in the sense of Hargreaves 
(1994). Sometimes the directors try to transform this contrived collegiality into a culture of 
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collaboration. For that, they favour the way of discussing both during the formal meetings and 
outside. The audit committee chairman creates informal meetings with the financial 
management members or with the external or internal auditors, always with very few people. 
These meetings aim to create trust relationships in establishing a mutual knowledge, more 
private, between the audit committee chairman and the financial team members or the 
external and internal auditors. These meetings also aim that the guests understand that the 
audit committee chairman is available as an adviser when it needs. A culture of collaboration 
is also built. Nevertheless as the directors and especially the audit committee chairman 
express themselves only during conversations, they cannot impose their points of view. They 
only have a power of suggesting. The financial management members as the auditors seem to 
take into consideration audit committee’s suggestions and expectations because the directors 
are responsible for the quality of financial statements too and because they have a different 
angle of sight. They are not accountants, they are managers. Then the financial management 
members and the auditors internalize directors’ expectations which feed their generalized 
other (Mead, 1934). The generalized other acts as a censor of behaviours. So directors’ 
suggestions can have an impact. 
Expressing themselves in an audible manner depends on the existence or not of a 
culture of collaboration for the directors. This culture of collaboration does not exist in itself. 
It needs some efforts from the audit committee chairman who plays a central role in 
establishing confidence relationships with the financial team members and with the external 
and internal auditors. These last ones are not obliged to accept these relationships. As an audit 
committee chairman said, the creation of trust depends on people. It needs also time. Time 
and efforts are the main components to reach this culture of collaboration. What requires a 
great involvement and a great receptiveness as well as relational abilities of the audit 
committee chairman. These relational abilities, the abilities to create trust relationships, is a 
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skill little considered in the previous research studies which are interested in the audit 
committee skills. Finally the audit committee chairman plays a central role in the creation of 
possible moment for audit committee’s expression. More widely it seems that it is him who 
create a living, interesting, useful and effective audit committee or not. 
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Appendix 1: Summary table of the interviews 
Firm (F) / Audit firm 
A 
Position inside the firm of interviewed 
people 
Interview duration (in 
mn) 
A1-1 Partner 45 
A1-2 Partner 45 
A1-3 Partner 40 
A2 Partner 20 
A3-1 Partner 60 
A3-2 Partner 45 
A3 (F4) Partner 75 
A4 (F1 and F2) Partner 50 
CFO 40 
F1 
Chief of internal audit 45 
CFO 45 
F2 
Chief of internal audit 60 (not recorded) 
Audit committee chairman 45 
F3 
Chief of internal audit 40 
F4 Chief of internal audit 45 
Audit committee chairman 60 
F5 
Chief of internal audit 45 (not recorded) 
CFO 35 
F6 
Audit committee director 45 
F7 CFO 60 
F8 Chief of internal audit 40 
F9 Chief of internal audit 45 
F10 Audit committee chairman 45 
F11 Audit committee director 40 
F12 Audit committee chairman 40 
F13 Audit committee director 45 (not recorded) 
F14 Audit committee director 45 (not recorded) 
 Total 20h45 
 
